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Summary findings
Instead  of targeting  poor areas, should poverty  programs  The geographic  effects  are reasonably  stable  over  time,
target households  with personal  attributes  that foster  robust  to testable  sources  of bias,  and consistent  with
poverty, no matter where they live?,  observed  migration  patterns.
Possibly  not. There may be "hidden" constraints  on  Poor areas  are not poor just  because  households  with
mobility,  or location may  reveal otherwise  hidden  readily  observable  attributes  that foster  poverty  are
household  atributes.  geographically  concentrated.  There appear to be sizable
Using  survey  data for Bangladesh,  Ravallion  and  spatial  differences  in the returns to given household
Wodon find significant  and sizeable  geographic  effects  characteristics.
on living  standards,  after controlling  for a wide range of  Their results  reinforce  the case for anti-poverty
nongeographic  characteristics  of households,  as would  programs  targeted to poor areas  even  in an economy
typically  be observable  to policymakers.  with few obvious  impediments  to mobility.
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Every country has its "poor areas"-places where the incidence of poverty is unusually high
by national standards. Governmental and non-governmental agencies have devised various
programs to target extra resources to these areas, with the aim of reducing poverty. 2
However, the case for targeting poor areas is not obvious in a setting in which there are no
evident barriers to migration. Suppose that households can freely choose their location; we can
term that state of affairs "free migration". If the economy is in equilibrium, such that nobody wants
to move, then standards of living must be completely determined by mobile non-geographic
household characteristics. For if geographic location were to have an effect on consumption after
controlling for those characteristics, then households would move to the areas with positive
geographic effects. An unusually high poverty rate in some area would still be possible in
equilibrium, through a spatial concentration of households with poor characteristics. But, as long as
it was possible to target according to non-geographic characteristics, there would be no point to
geographic targeting. Attempts to redistribute between rich areas and poor areas would generate
migration until a new equilibrium is restored, consistent with the new distribution of non-
geographic attributes. There would be no point using residential location as an indicator for
targeting anti-poverty schemes. 3
2 For  an overview  of past uses  of geographic  targeting  as an anti-poverty  policy  in developing
countries  see Lipton  and  Ravallion  (1995,  section  6). Discussions  of the case  for such  targeting  have  assumed
that migration  is restricted  and viewed  place  of residence  as a poverty  indicator,  albeit  an imperfect  one (see,
for example,  Ravallion,  1993).
3 There  may  still  be an efficiency  case  for poor-area  programs  when  regional  governments  supply
public  services.  Without  appropriate  inter-regional  transfers,  free  migration  between  the regional  jurisdictions
does not,  in general,  imply  efficient  local  provisioning  (Flatters,  Henderson  and  Mieszkowski,  1974;
Atkinson  and Stiglitz,  1980,  Chapter  17). It is however  unclear  whether  the  optimal  transfers  would  resemble
2This argument against poor area policies may, however, overlook some important features
of the real world. Two stand out.  Firstly, there may be constraints to achieving a free migration
equilibrium in practice. Impediments to migration can take many forms. Typically, there are very
few governmental restrictions on internal migration, although both geography and cultural-
linguistic diversity can remain real constraints. But even without obvious social, physical or
governmental impediments to internal migration, moving can be a costly and risky venture for poor
people. Local personal ties of patronage or indebtedness, imperfect information, lack of access to
credit or insurance, and even small but (to poor people) significant costs of moving can all entail
that a country in which migration is "officially" unrestricted may still be a long way from the
equilibrium to be expected with free migration. Poor area programs then make more sense. Strong
geographic effects on living standards for similar households may exist and persist over (possibly
considerable) time. This is not inconsistent with migration, which may well be a slow
"disequilibrium" process of adjustment to the very existence of geographic effects.
Secondly, there may be constraints on the ability of policy makers to target household
characteristics when attempting to reduce poverty.  This leads to another argument for geographic
targeting even in settings in which mobility is unrestricted. Standards of living may be completely
determined by mobile non-geographic characteristics of households, but a significant subset of
these characteristics are unobserved by policy makers and are spatially autocorrelated as a result of
a sorting process through migration. The key question for policy is then the quantitative
a "poor-area  program".  Also,  there  is nothing  to stop  the  local governments  from making  the transfers
themselves, and behaving strategically. Then the Nash equilibrium with free migration  will be efficient
without central intervention (Myers, 1990);  this also holds when there are inter-jurisdictional  spillovers
(Wellisch, 1993).
3importance of the geographic effects which cannot be attributed to the household attributes
observable by policy makers.
We examine these issues empirically, using data for Bangladesh. It is known that there are
large spatial differences in levels of living in Bangladesh. Yet, there are no administrative
impediments to internal migration and few physical ones, since the country is spatially contiguous,
with over 120 million people living in an area roughly the same as that of England or Florida. Nor is
it plausible that there are significant cultural barriers to internal migration. The vast majority of the
population share the same ethnicity, language and religion.
We show, however, that sizable geographic differences in living standards in Bangladesh
persist when one takes account of the spatial concentration of households with readily observable
non-geographic characteristics conducive to poverty. The same, observationally equivalent,
household is poor in one place but not another. Moreover, these geographic effects appear to be
stable over time. Differences in measurable non-geographic household characteristics do account
for a share of the differences in living standards, and there could well be some omitted household
attributes, which may be spatially correlated and so bias our estimates of the pure geographic
effects.  However, our results indicate that the geographic differences in living standards cannot be
readily attributed to differences in non-geographic household characteristics. Indeed, where you
live appears to be independently important, and very important quantitatively, in explaining poverty
in Bangladesh.
The following section presents our tests for geographic effects on living standards. Section
3 discusses some possible sources of bias in our results. The presence and implications of the
identified geographic effects are discussed in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
42  Testing  for geographic  effects
The arguments  for and against  geographic  targeting  discussed  in the introduction  rest in
part on an empirical  question:  are there geographical  effects  on living  standards  after controlling  for
observable  non-geographic  characteristics  of households?
To address  that question,  we use the micro-data  from two comparable  cross-sectional
surveys  for Bangladesh  three  years  apart. Using  two surveys  allows  us to check robustness  of
geographic  effects  over time to spatially  correlated  measurement  errors,  as long as these  are
independent  over time.  With these  data we estimate  regression  models  for real consumption,
defined  as nominal  consumption  deflated  by a regional-specific  poverty  line  incorporating  spatial
cost of living differences  facing  the poor in Bangladesh.  The models  include  a reasonably  wide
range of measurable  household  characteristics  as controls  for identifying  geographic  effects.
Nonetheless,  there may  be biases  due to omitted  household  characteristics  which  are spatially
correlated.  We provide  tests for robustness  to the specification  of the set of household
characteristics  and also a test for possible  sample-selection  bias due to rural-urban  migration.
To analyze  the determinants  of consumption,  we estimate  separate  regressions  for each of
the urban  and rural sectors  using  two sets of household  sample  data,  denoted  U and R for urban
and  rural areas  respectively.  To measure  real consumption  C we deflate  nominal  consumption  by a
date and area-specific  poverty  line (discussed  below).  We assume  that logC is a linear  function  of a
kxl vector  of observed  non-geographic  variables  (X) and a mxl vector  of locational  dummy
variables  (D). The function  differs  between  urban  and  rural  samples:
logCi = au + Pu'Xi +  6u'Di + cui  (ieU)  (1)
logCi  =  aR  +  PR'Xi  + OR'Dj + e  (ieR)  (2)
5where au RU PU.R  and 8U,R  are lx 1, kx I and mx I vectors of parameters and the error terms (eU,R)  are
each independently distributed with zero mean.  The vector Xi includes:
* Demographics: numbers of babies, children, and adults (plus their squared values);
household structure (head with a spouse, head without a spouse and married, etc.,); sex of the
head; age of the household head and its square; religion of the household (Muslim or non-Muslim).
* Education: the education level along four categories of the household head, of his spouse,
and the difference between the highest education level in the household and the maximum of the
education level of the head and the spouse (or of the head only when there is no spouse).
* Land owned: the household's land owned in four categories depending on area.
• Occupation: the household head's main occupation (twelve occupational classifications
were used: five agricultural, six non agricultural, and one for non working heads).
The data are the 1988/89 and 1991/92 Household Expenditure Surveys of the Bangladesh
Bureau of Statistics (hereafter BBS). The two surveys are independent, but otherwise used
virtually identical methods (in the sampling, questionnaires, and processing). These data are
appropriate for the task at hand: one of their main stated objectives is to monitor consumption and
poverty in the country. The surveys provide detailed information on the expenses of each
household. A few non recurrent expenses for ceremonial activities (marriage, death) have been
netted out of the consumption aggregate. After data cleaning, the two survey rounds cover
respectively 5626 and 5725 households. Two variables can be used to define the geographic
location of households. We know if the households live in urban or rural areas, and we know to
6which of 17 districts each belongs. 4 The combination yields 34 "areas", 17 rural, 17 urban.
Consumption is normalized by a poverty line giving the estimated cost of living in the area
where the household lives. The poverty lines are based on a well-defined food bundle that has been
widely used in poverty measures for Bangladesh; this meets predefined daily nutritional
requirements.  Next, we used the survey data to estimate for each year and each area the price of
the items in the food bundle, controlling for household characteristics in order to capture the price
paid by the poor. (The unit values from the survey were purged of differences in product quality;
see Wodon, 1996). Finally, given that prices for non-food goods are not available, we estimated for
each year and each area an allowance for non-food consumption; this was equal to what the
households whose total expenditure is equal to the cost of the food bundle are expected to spend
on non-food items (Ravallion, 1994). Note that this yields a relatively low allowance for non-food
consumption since it is based on what households who do not meet their nutritional requirement
spend on non-food items. Given that these households only have enough to meet their basic food
needs, we can assume that the allowance for non-food expenses covers (at best) bare essentials.
Summing up the allowances for food and non-food consumption yields the total poverty lines by
year and by area. We computed 14 area-specific poverty lines for each of the two survey years;
4 There  are  three  types  of urban  area identified  in the data. However,  because  of smaller  sample
sizes,  we aggregated  all urban strata  together.  There  are officially  20 "Greater  Districts".  However,  for one
district  (Chittagong  Hill Tracts),  no observations  were  available.  Two additional  districts  (Jamalpur  and
Patuakhali)  have  no observations  corresponding  to urban  households.  These  two districts  were aggregated
with contiguous  districts  of a similar  level  of development.  We  thus have  in total 17  greater  districts.  If the
sample  sizes  were  sufficiently  large,  in order  to test for structural  changes  in parameter  estimates  across
districts  and urban/rural  areas,  we could  ideally  run 34 separate  regressions  for the urban  and rural  areas  of
our 17  districts. In practice,  due to our limited  sample  sizes,  we estimate  regressions  for  the urban and rural
sectors  only.
7details can be found in Wodon (1996).5
Our estimates of the regressions (1) and (2) are in Table 1. The standard errors use the
Huber-White correction for heteroscedasticity. The following observations can be made:
*  Different models are determining consumption in urban and rural areas. The null
hypothesis that all coefficients are the same in both equations is rejected at the one percent level.
Table 2 gives the test results. Looking at subsets of household characteristics, the hypotheses that
the coefficients are the same are also rejected at the one percent level for all subsets of variables
except for the constant, household size, and the other demographic/religion variables.
- Tlhere  are a number of significant demographic effects in both sectors. Chief among them
is household size: the larger the household, the lower its per capita consumption. 6
* There are significant gains from education. This holds in both urban and rural areas,
though the proportionate consumption gains from extra schooling are higher in urban areas.
• More,  land yields significantly higher consumption in both urban and rural areas.
-There are also significant differences associated with occupation; all occupation groups
are better off than landless agricultural workers.
* There are significant differences in consumption between districts, and between the rural
and urban areas of given districts, after controlling for the above household characteristics.
5 Due to small  sample  sizes  and to the  estimation  requirements,  we  had to aggregate  the 34 areas  into
14  greater  areas  to compute  the poverty  lines  for each  of the two survey  year. The computation  of poverty
lines  for these  14 areas  is the best  that can  be done  with the  available  data  to control  for price  differences.  It
is an improvement  over  the common  practice  of computing  only two  poverty  lines,  one for urban  and one for
rural  areas.
6 The  welfare  interpretation  of this finding  is questionable.  The  effect  of household  size  could  reflect
an error in measuring  welfare,  in that scale  economies  in consumption  within  households  have  been  ignored
(Lanjouw  and Ravallion,  1995).
83  How robust are our results?
There are good reasons to be skeptical of the above results. With the data available, we
cannot alleviate all possible concerns, but we can address some.
3.1  Selection bias
The existence of rural-urban migration suggests that place of residence may not be
exogenous. To test for this source of bias we estimated the following version of the standard
switching model. 7 In addition to equations (1) and (2) we have:
Ij* = ac +  log G, - y:'W,  + eci  (3)
where Ii = 1 -if Ij* > 0 and Ij = 0 if I**  < 0.  Equation (3) gives the net gain (or loss) Ij* to living in an
urban area rather than a rural area.  This is a function of the real per capita consumption gain (log
G 1), minus any cost of living in an urban area not already included in the estimates of the poverty
lines and represented by y,'Wi.  Although we do not observe this net gain or loss, we observe the
decision by each household to live in an urban (IF=1)  or a rural (Ij=O)  area, as well as its resulting
real per capita consumption.  Substituting (1) and (2) in (3) yields the reduced form equation for
the switching regression:
Ij* = ac + (au - aR)  + (P.  - PR)XI + ( 8 u -8 R)'Di  - yc'Wi  + eCi  (4)
Let iji denote the fitted values of Ii*, and let 4 and cb  be the density and cumulative density
functions of the standard normal. The conditional means of the disturbances in (1) and (2) are
E[eu II;  =l]  =  yuc  +(*)/4(*Ij) and E[eRIIi=0] = (RC  I-4(4O)I(l-0((;))],  where ouc  and aRC  are the
covariances between the error terms of the two consumption equations (1)-(2) and the error term
7  There  are a number  of expositions,  including  Maddala  (1983,  Chapter  9). An early  application  to
migration  was  Nakosteen  and  Zimmer  (1980).
9of the switching equation (3). This yields:
E[logC, I Ij=I] = au + Pu'Xi +°u 'D  + 0 uc 4z(*I)/(D4,(ti)  (5)
E[logCj I I*=O]  =  aR  + PR Xj+OR  'Dj - (JRC  (4KA*)/[l  c'(lf)]  (6)
With sample selection the estimates of ouc and ARC  should be statistically significant. To
estimate aIuc  and aRC,  the usual two-stage procedure involves first estimating the reduced form (4),
and then estimating (1) and (2) using the Mills' ratios computed from (4).8
With our set of regressors, the estimates of ouc and (RC  were not significant. There was no
sign of selection bias.  This also held for a number of ad hoc alternative specifications. The test thus
suggests that we can make use of parameter estimates from the urban and rural regressions without
worrying about sample selection bias.
However, this test relies on a number of assumptions which highlight the difficulty of
conducting the selection test. The first set of assumptions involves implicit restrictions on the
migration process and occupational choice. Including the geographic dummies in the urban and
rural consumption regressions and using the above specification for the switching equation
implicitly restricts migration from rural to urban areas to take place within the same district.  This is
because in the switching equation, the net gain from living in urban or rural areas is district-specific
for any given household due to the inclusion of the term (8u - 8R)  'D 2. The gain to moving from one
8  If we were interested  in the structural  equation (3.1), we could use the predicted values from (2.1)
and (2.2). To do so, we should have variables in W not included in X and D. While this identification
condition may seem innocuous, it is not straightforward  to find variables which affect the location decision of
households  but not their real per capita consumption.  In the literature on switching models, identification has
often been obtained by excluding one or several variables from the consumption regressions  or by using
different expressions of similar variables in different equations (such as years of schooling  in one case and
degree obtained in the other). For us, because we do not find strong evidence of sample selection and because
of the difficulties to be discussed below, we need not estimate  the structural equation, so that the solution to
the identification  problem is of less concern.
10district to another cannot be factored in. If we had migration information in the data, we could
solve the problem by assigning to a household leaving a rural area of district j for an urban area of
district k the corresponding gain °Uk  -
8Rj*  In the absence of migration information, we are left with
the choice between implicitly restricting migration to take place within districts, or not taking into
account sectoral effects within districts in the switching equation. The first alternative is not
supported by the facts. Using the 1991 census, BBS (1995a: 46, Table 3.5) found significant
migration between districts and larger administrative divisions. 9 The second alternative is not
supported by the facts either, since geographic effects appear to be significant and consistent with
observed migration (as discussed further below, areas with favorable geographic effects such as the
urban areas of the Dhaka district are also those with large immigration).  Note that similar
reasoning can be applied to the occupation dummies. The presence of the occupation terms in (pu -
PR)YXi  in the switching regression assumes that when households decide to live in urban versus
rural areas, they do not consider changing occupation. Again, this is unrealistic since most
households leaving rural areas give up their agricultural jobs to take on non agricultural jobs in
urban areas.
The second set of assumptions involves endogeneity problems. Some urban households
may have better educated members because they live in urban areas, rather than choosing to live in
urban areas because they have better educated members and the returns to education are greater
9 Given  that the  Dhaka  SMA  is by far the  largest  urban  area  in the country,  and given  that in
percentage  it has grown  faster  than  most  other  urban  areas  (except  the Rasjhahi  SMA),  we could  assume  for
simplicity  that  the migration  to the urban  areas  of the Dhaka  district  accounts  for most of the exodus  from
rural  areas. With  this assumption,  we could  estimate  the  above  switching  regression  model  with  the  choice  of
location  being  the Dhaka  SMA  in the first  equation,  and all other  areas  in the second. Again,  when  doing  so,
we did not obtain  significant  estimates  for the  coefficients  of the  Mills' ratios.
IIthere. Similarly, some households may have more land because they live in rural areas, rather than
choosing to live in rural areas because they have more land and the returns to land are greater there.
The potential endogeneity of household characteristics also applies to demographic variables if, for
example, location affects the number of children in a household rather than the other way around.
Under such endogeneity, the switching model would be miss-specified.
For these reasons, our results rejecting selection bias must be deemed at best suggestive.
3.2  Measurement error in the cost-of-living deflators
Welfare-measurement errors related to household (non-geographic) characteristics will not
bias our estimates of geographic effects. If, for example, the use of a "per capita" normalization
does not deal adequately with economies of size in household consumption or demographic
differences in consumption needs then this will be picked up by the demographic variables on the
right hand size. This alters the welfare interpretation of those variables, but does not bias our
estimates of the geographic effects.
However, the method of adjusting for spatial cost-of-living differences is more worrying.
We may observe significant geographic effects because of measurement errors in the poverty lines
used for adjusting nominal consumption to differences in costs of living between districts.
Specifically, while our food poverty lines may be assumed to track differences in costs of living
reasonably well, our estimates for the non-food component of the poverty lines may be off-track
since they are not based on observed differences in prices for similar goods. To check the
robustness of our estimates to alternative methods, we computed a second set of poverty lines
entailing larger allowances for non-food consumption. The non-food component for an area was
defined as the mean non-food spending of households whose food (rather than total) consumption
12equals the food poverty line. At this point, households spend more on non-food items that when
total consumption is equal to the food poverty line. The differences between the poverty lines by
district are also larger. The second set of poverty lines yields lower levels of real consumptions, but
the results in terms of district coefficients are not affected. The correlation between the coefficient
estimates of the district dummies using the two sets of poverty lines is 0.88 for the urban
regressions, and 0.98 for the rural regressions. The levels of significance are virtually unaltered.
What would it take to nullify the effects of all dummy coefficients in the urban and rural
regressions? Because poverty lines are geographically defined and geographic dummies are
included in the regressions, a different set of poverty lines has no effect on the value and
significance level of the estimates of non-geographic coefficients in the urban and rural regressions.
But it has an impact on the value (but not the standard deviation) of the constant terms and the
coefficients of the district dummies (Wodon, 1996). Holding the urban and rural poverty lines for
the Dhaka district constant, we can compute for each district alternative poverty lines yielding zero
district coefficients in the two regressions. Denoting by ZURk the original poverty lines yielding the
estimates of °u Rk reported in Table 1, the alternative poverty lines are:
Zuk  =  ZUk /eXP(-
8 Uk)  (7)
Zrk*=  ZRk /exp(-8Rk)  (8)
for urban and rural areas respectively of district k.
The implicit poverty lines computed using (7) and (8) turn out to be implausible. Because
the conditional consumption tends to be higher in the Dhaka district than elsewhere (whether we
consider urban or rural areas), the poverty lines in most other districts must fall to yield conditional
measures of living standards similar to those existing in Dhaka. The implied differentials in poverty
13lines  are too large  to be believed.  Consider  urban  areas. When  we are using the initial  poverty  lines
corresponding  to the lower  non-food  allowance  (described  above)  the decrease  in the poverty  lines
of the non-Dhaka  districts  necessary  for nullifying  the coefficient  estimates  is so large  that two
thirds of the districts  have  negative  non-food  allowances  if we keep the food  component  of the
poverty  lines  unaltered.  Even when  we are using  the initial  poverty  lines  obtained  with the larger
non-food  allowance-corresponding  to the non-food  consumption  of the households  spending  the
food  poverty  lines  on food-the  change  in poverty  lines  needed  to nullify  the coefficient  estimates
are such that several  of the districts  would  still  need  to have  negative  or zero non-food  allowances.
The geographic  effects are too large to be attributed  to measurement  errors in the poverty  lines.
3.3  Omitted variables
The geographic  effects  may also  be due to omitted  household  variables  which  are correlated
with geographic  location.  To test the robustness  of the geographic  effects  to the specification  of the
model  we searched  for additional  household  variables  which  might affect  consumption  and be
correlated  with geographic  location. The only major  group of household  characteristics  available  in
the data sets which  we did not use in equations  (1)-(2)  consists  of housing  attributes.  These are
almost  certainly  endogenous,  though  they  may also  be correlated  with important  omitted  variables
such as long-term  wealth.  We preferred  to exclude  housing  attributes  from our main regressions.
However,  for the purposes  of this test, let us assume  that  the endogeneity  problem  is less severe
than the omitted  variables  bias. For each household,  we have  information  on the dwelling's  wall and
roof  material,  on the number  of bedrooms  and their size,  and on its latrine  and water  systems.
Adding  the housing  characteristics  did not result  in any major difference  in the estimates  of
the parameters  of the district  dummies. At the five percent  level,  the coefficient  estimates  of the
14district dummies obtained on adding the housing variables (a total of 23 dummies) differed
significantly from the estimates reported in Table I for only 3 of the 17 urban areas, and 4 of the 17
rural areas. It remained true that we could safely reject the null that the coefficients on either the
geographic or non-geographic variables were equal in urban and rural areas.
4  How much do geographic  effects  matter?
4.1  Decompositions
Mean real per capita consumption is much higher in urban than in rural areas. In 1991-92,
urban households had on average a per capita consumption equal to one and a half times their
poverty line, while the consumption of rural households barely matched their poverty line. Are
these differences due to household characteristics or to geographic effects?
T-he  observed urban-rural difference in mean log consumption can be written:
E[logCi  I ieU, Xi  =Xu]  - E[logCi  I ieR, Xi =XR] =
(aU -aR) + (PUX  - PR XR) + Ek (SUk sUk  SRk  8n)  (9)
where XU,R  are the sample means for urban and rural areas respectively, and SURk  is  the proportion
of district k's households in each sector. Table 3 provides the results of the decomposition. The
difference between the two constants is not significant. However, that does not mean that living in
an urban or a rural area has no impact on a household's standard of living, holding other
characteristics constant. This point can be seen by looking at the second term in the decomposition
which represents the differential impact of all non-excluded and non-geographic variables in the
two sectors.  For each year, most of the urban-rural differential is due not only to higher education
levels in the urban areas, but also to significantly higher retums to education there. The edge
15provided by education in urban areas is not compensated by higher land ownership and higher
returns to land in rural areas. The lower returns to land (and higher returns to education) in urban
areas are consistent with the stylized fact that many rural households migrating to cities are landless
or near landless.
The third and last term in the decomposition is close to zero for both years.  This term
indicates that on average and controlling for other characteristics, the gap between the urban areas
of Dhaka and all the other urban areas (Ek  SUk  °Uk)  is  of the same order of magnitude as the gap
between the rural areas of Dhaka and all the other rural areas (yk SR 6')
To compare living standards in two urban or two rural districts at one point of time while
controlling for other household characteristics, we may simply compare the coefficients of the
district dummies. In 1991-92, all but one of the urban and all but two of the rural district coefficient
estimates are negative. Households living in the capital district of Dhaka appear to be better off
than their urban or rural counterparts in other districts after controlling for the measured non-
geographic characteristics. The comparative edge of the households in the Dhaka district makes
sense since Dhaka City is the capital and it is better endowed than other areas. It is also consistent
with the large migration to the capital which resulted in an annual rate of growth between 1981 and
1991 for the Standard Metropolitan Areas of Dhaka of 7.3 percent, as compared to 4.1 percent for
the Chittagong SMA and 4.5 percent for the Khulna SMA (the Rasjhahi SMA grew at a rate of  8.0
percent). Note also that spatial effects are not limited to differences between Dhaka and the other
districts. Many district coefficients are significantly different from each other.
What about sectoral effects within districts? Even if there are no pure sector-wide effects
(appearing through the constants), there may be sectoral effects within districts. Holding everything
16else constant, we may have a significant difference between the urban and rural households of a
given district even if this difference does not hold when we are comparing all urban and all rural
districts at once. And we may as before also have indirect sectoral effects working through
differential returns to household characteristics between urban and rural areas.
To compare the conditional mean consumption of the urban and rural areas of a given
district, we cannot rely only upon the difference between the coefficients of the district dummies in
the urban and rural regressions. First, for the non-geographic variables, we need to take into
account the different returns to these variables in urban and rural areas. Second, for the geographic
variables, observing a statistically significant difference between the urban (°uj) and rural (
6 Rj)
coefficients of district j in the two regressions does not mean that the impact of living in that district
will vary between urban and rural areas. The district effects captured by the dummy coefficients are
relative to the excluded dummy in both regressions. If, in the excluded district of Dhaka, there is a
difference between the living standards of urban and rural households after controlling for other
characteristics (this difference will show up in the constant terms), then even if there is no
difference in the conditional living standards of urban and rural households in other districts, we
may still observe significant differences in the urban and rural dummy coefficients of these other
districts. Third, in asking how conditional standards of living differ between the rural and urban
areas of a given district, we should not condition on the sample mean characteristics of the
households living in urban and rural areas because these sample means are not equal, and hence we
are not holding non-geographic characteristics constant.
A better approach is to compute the expected gain in consumption from living in urban
areas of a given district over rural areas, given that the household has the national mean XN (say).
17For the j'th district, this is given by:
E[logCi I ieU, Di  =I,  Xi =XNI - E[logCi I ieR, Di  =Y, Xi =XN] =
(aU - aR)  + (PU&  - PR')XN +  (°Uj -R  Rj)  (10)
where Di denotes the m-vector with 1 as the j'th element and 0 otherwise. The first two terms on
the right hand side are the same for all districts. The first term is the same as that of equation (9). It
represents the impact of unexplained sector-wide and excluded dummy differences between urban
and rural areas. The second term represents the impact of differential returns to household
characteristics in urban and rural areas. The term is the same as that of equation (9), except for the
fact that we conditioned on national sample means rather than on urban and rural means. When
conditioning on national means, we "correct" the expected consumptions obtained when
conditioning on urban and rural means by adding PU'(XN - Xu) to the urban consumption measures
and PR'(XN- XR)  to the rural measures. Because urban households tend to have characteristics (less
children, better education, better jobs) which are more favorable than the national average,
conditioning on national means results for them in a lower estimate of their log consumption than
would have been obtained with urban means. The reverse applies to rural households for which
conditional log consumption using national means is higher than when using rural means.' 0
In equation (10), the sum of the two first terms (0.21 in 1988-89 and 0.18 in 1991-92)
accounts for the difference between the conditional consumption of households living in the urban
and rural areas of the Dhaka district when conditioning on national means.  For the other districts,
'0 The  terms  PU(XN - XU)  and  PR(XN  - XR)  turn  out to be equal  respectively  to -0.13 and 0.04 for  both
survey  years.  The  equality  for both years  of the urban  as well  as the  rural  corrections  in both years  suggests  a
stability  over  time in the  differences  between  each  sector  and the national  average  when  the benefits  of these
differences  are  computed  using  the year's  returns.
18the differences between conditional urban and rural living standards may be greater or smaller than
those observed in Dhaka due to the third term (8uj - 8R). For 1991-92, as can be computed from
the coefficient estimates given in Table 1, (8uj - 8Rj)  is close to zero (i.e. it varies between -0.06 and
0.04) for half of the districts.  In this first group of districts, the differences in expected log
consumptions between urban and rural areas are as pronounced as those existing in the Dhaka
district. However, for the other half of the districts, (8uj -
8 Rj ) is negative and large (i.e. it varies
between -0.17 and -0.46), suggesting few overall differences in expected log real consumptions
between urban and rural areas once we control not only for household characteristics, but also for
the sectoral geographic effects within districts. This differentiated pattern between the two groups
of districts is relatively stable over time as the correlation between the sectoral geographic effects
(°uj  - Rj  ) of the two years is large and positive (0.84).
The differentiated patterns in sectoral effects within districts are not random. It is striking
that the urban-rural conditional differences appear to follow divisional patterns (each administrative
division consists of several contiguous districts). Most districts in the Rajshahi division (Rajshahi,
Rangpur, Pabna, and Bogra) and in the Dhaka division (Dhaka, Mymensingh, and Faridpur) have
large differences in standards of living between urban and rural areas after controlling for household
and district characteristics (the only two exceptions are Tangail/Jamalpur in the Dhaka division and
Dinajpur in the Rajshahi division). In the other divisions, urban and rural standards of living tend to
be similar once we control for household and district characteristics (the two exceptions are the
Khulna district for which urban households are better off and Noakhali for which rural households
are better off). These patterns match the migration observed by the BBS (1995a: 46, Table 3.5)
between administrative divisions.  The BBS estimated that the number of life time net migrants for
191991 to be positive for the Dhaka (642,000 net migrants) and Rajshahi (422,000) divisions, and
negative for the Barisal (481,000),  Chittagong (-285,000) and Khulna (-298,000) divisions.  Thus
our results are consistent with the plausible assumption that, given their characteristics, people
migrate to areas where they can obtain higher consumption.
4.2  Measures of mean consumption
The relative importance of geographic effects can also be assessed by comparing the actual
measures of consumption with simulated measures in which suitable controls are applied, so as to
isolate the pure effects of geographic variation. Two sets of conditional simulated measures of
consumption for the 34 geographic locations can be computed.
The first set of measures isolates the purely geographic effects by controlling for all the non-
geographic characteristics; this is termed the geographic profile of living standards.  It is obtained
by using the parameter estimates of the two regressions to estimate for the urban and rural areas of
each district the consumption of a household with the national mean characteristics, denoted XN.  If
consumption was fully determined by the observed non-geographic household characteristics, then
the coefficients of the district dummies would be zero in both regressions, the returns to non-
geographic characteristics (both those included in the regression and those excluded as reference
dummies) would be the same in urban and rural sectors, and the two constant terms would be the
same. Then the conditional measures of consumption would be the same everywhere. Put
differently, the difference between the geographic and unconditional profiles reflects the impact of
non-geographic effects on standards of living.
The second set of measures isolates the effects of the non-geographic characteristics, by
controlling for the geographic differences. We call this the concentration profile (because it reflects
20the spatial concentration of non-geographic characteristics). In this case only differences in
geographic characteristics come into play when we compare these conditional measures to the
actual (unconditional) ones.  Computing the mean parameter estimates aN  =  su (aN + Xk  NO)  +  SR
(aR + Ek  8R) and PN  =  SUPR  +SRPR  where su and SR are the urban and rural household shares, we
can define the measure of consumption for the urban areas in district j conditional on geographic
characteristics as logCj =  aN  +  BN'XjU  where Xju represents the sample mean non-geographic
characteristics of the households living in urban areas of district j.  Doing the same for all urban and
rural areas, we obtain the concentration profile. By seeing how much these simulated measures vary
between the 34 urban and rural areas, we can assess the contribution of the concentration effects to
the differences in living standards."
Table 4 provides estimates of the actual (unconditional) and the two simulated profiles for
mean real consumption by area. 12 Consider first the pure geographic profile obtained by
conditioning on XN. Urban conditional measures of consumption tend to be larger than rural ones,
1 '  We can ignore the residuals in the geographic and concentration  conditional  profiles since the
residuals must sum to zero in each district due to the inclusion of dummy district variables in the regressions
(for if the mean residuals were not zero in a given district, a better fit could be obtained in the regression
through a revised estimate for the coefficient of the corresponding  dummy). Therefore, whether the residuals
are due to omitted individual characteristics  (in which case they should be included  in the concentration
profile) or to omitted area characteristics  (in which  case they should  be included in the geographic profile),
their mean vanishes in each district so that they do not affect the mean consumption level or probability of
being poor of our representative  households.
12 Note that the weighted sum of the conditional  urban (or rural) log real consumptions by district
when conditioning on non-geographic  characteristics  need not be equal to the unconditional log real
consumption at the mean of the urban sample as a whole. To see this, denote as before by suj  the household
share of district  j among all urban areas. In logarithms,  the household share weighted sum of the conditional
real per capita consumption levels by district is ,j  Suj  E[logCi  I ieU, Di =Di,  Xi  =Xu] = ,j  suj [au + PUxu  +
°uj] which is equal to the corresponding  unconditional  value obtained by the properties of linear unbiased
regressions as E[logCi I  ieU, Xi  =Xu]= au + PuXu  +  Y_j  su;  °uj.) On the other hand, in terms of log real
consumptions, _j  suj  exp{E[logCi  I  ieU, Di  =Di, Xi=Xu]  I is not equal to exp{E[logCi  I  ieU, Xi =Xu]}, simply
because the exponential operator is not linear.
21in part because  of the difference  in constants  between  the urban  and rural regressions  (au -aR  = 0.26
in 1991-92). For most urban  areas  the geographic  conditional  consumptions  are lower  than  the
unconditional  consumptions  due to the negative  urban  correction  imposed  when  controlling  for the
mean household  characteristics,  set at the national  mean. As noted  earlier,  urban  households  tend
to have  more  favorable  characteristics  than  rural  households,  which  results  for them in conditional
levels of consumption  below  what would  have  been  obtained  using urban  means.  The reverse  holds
for rural consumptions.  Nevertheless,  there  is a large positive  correlation  between  the geographic
and the unconditional  profiles  (the correlations  are 0.84, 0.81 and 0.98 for all areas, the urban
;areas,  and the rural  areas respectively  in 1991-92).
Consider  next the concentration  profile  obtained  by using  the weighted  means of the urban
and rural  parameter  estimates. Urban  areas  are still for the most part better  off than rural ones, but
this time,  it is because  households  living in urban  districts  tend  to have those  non-geographic
characteristics  which  raise living standards.  The conditional  concentration  consumption  measures
for urban  areas are still  below the unconditional  ones,  but this time because  returns  to
characteristics  tend to be higher in urban  areas  than  nationally  (the reverse  is true for rural areas).
The correlation  between  the concentration  and actual  profiles  is lower (0.47, 0.20 and 0.19 for all
areas, the urban areas,  and the rural  areas respectively  in 1991-92)  than  between  the geographic
and actual  profiles.
In Figure 1,  there are 34 points  corresponding  to the urban  and rural areas of the 17
districts. The districts  have  been ranked  on the horizontal  axis  by unconditional  consumption  (in
proportion  to the poverty  line). The 45 degree  line thus represents  the unconditional  profile. The
two dashed  locii represent  the geographic  and concentration  profiles. The overall  positive  slope
22(0.70) of the regression of the geographic on the unconditional profile reflects the fact that
geographic effects account for a large part of the unconditional differences in consumption between
areas (i.e., the geographic regression is close to the 45 degree line). Controlling for non-
geographic characteristics reduces the welfare gaps between districts, but not by much. There is
also a positive correlation between the concentration and actual profiles, but the relationship is
weaker, as indicated by the smaller slope of the concentration regression (0.21).
Another summary statistic that shows clearly the relative importance of geographic versus
non-geographic effects in determining consumption is the spatial variance of the simulated
geographic and concentration consumptions divided by the spatial variance of the actual values.
Pooling urban and rural areas, the variance of the geographic profile accounts for 80 percent of the
variance of the actual profile in 1991-92, while the variance of the concentration profile accounts
for 59 percent of the unconditional variance.
If we observe genuine geographic effects, these should be stable over relatively short
periods of time. One way to check the stability of geographic effects over time consists in
computing the correlation between the district-level dummy coefficients of the two years. This
correlation is large and positive for both the urban (0.75) and the rural (0.84) regressions. A more
comprehensive approach taking into account not only district-level but also other types of
geographic effects (sector-wide effects and sectoral effects within districts) is to compare the
consumption levels of all urban and rural areas over time while holding household characteristics
constant at (say) the national 1991-92 sample means XN. Table 4 also gives the conditional
geographic profile for 1988-89 using the national 1991-92 means. The correlations between the
conditional geographic profiles for the two years are positive and large as expected (0.83, 0.88 and
230.83 for all areas, the urban areas, and the rural areas).
4.3  Poverty measures
For targeting purposes, comparisons of poverty rather than mean consumption are often
relied upon in order to place more emphasis on less favored households. From the urban and rural
regressions, we can estimate probabilities of being poor.  Since C 1 is nominal consumption deflated
by the poverty line, a negative (positive) value of its log means that the household is poor (not
poor).  Assuming normally distributed errors, and conditioning on national sample means for 1991-
92, the geographic poverty profile is based on the conditional probabilities of being poor for
household living in district j:
Prob[logC;<0  I ieU,  Di=D', X,=XN]=(D[-(aU  + PU'XN + 8U;  )/oU]  (11)
Prob[logC 1<0 I ieR,  Di=D', XI=XN]=D[-(aR  + PRXN + 8Rj  )/IR]  (12)
for urban and rural areas respectively, where ou and OR  are the standard deviations of the errors in
the urban and rural regressions and CI  is the cumulative density of the standard normal.' 3 For the
concentration profile, we condition on the weighted means of the urban and rural parameters.
Table 5 provides the unconditional, concentration, and geographic profiles for the
percentage of people in each area deemed to live in households with mean consumption below the
poverty line (the "headcount index" of poverty). Most urban areas have lower measures of poverty
than rural areas. Note that the geographic headcounts are based on national rather than urban
means for non-geographic households characteristics. This tends to increase their headcount
13  At the aggregate level, the use of the headcount indices does not maintain  the property that
unconditional  and conditional  measures of welfare are equal. Moreover, because of the nonlinearity of the
normal cumulative  density function, we cannot provide linear decompositions  of the differences between
headcount indices. Yet, we can still compare the conditional  and unconditional  headcount indices obtained by
district at one point of time, as well as the conditional  indices obtained over time.
24indices when compared to the unconditional benchmark. By contrast, the rural geographic
headcounts tend to be lower than the unconditional ones. The concentration headcounts for urban
areas are also higher than the unconditional ones because the national mean returns to
characteristics tend to be lower than the urban returns. The reverse applies to the rural
concentration headcounts. As for consumption, the correlation between the geographic and
unconditional profiles is larger than that between the concentration and unconditional profiles. In
fact, the geographic poverty profile is very similar to the actual (unconditional) one. For example,
the poorest area in 1991-92 (rural Rangpur) is also the poorest when one controls for non-
geographic household characteristics (65% are poor unconditionally; 62% with the controls). And
the least poor area (rural Sylhet, with a headcount index of 11% in 1991-92) is also the least poor
with the controls (9%). When urban and rural areas are pooled, the variance of the geographic
profile is equal to that of the unconditional profile, while the variance of the concentration profile is
less than half that of the unconditional profile.
In Figure 2, the areas have been ranked by the unconditional headcount index for 1991-92.
With a slope of 0.86, the dashed line for the regression of the geographic poverty measures on the
unconditional poverty measures is close to the slope of the 45 degree line representing the
unconditional profile. The slope of the concentration regression is lower, at 0.21.
5  Conclusion
We find significant and sizable geographic effects on living standards in Bangladesh, after
controlling for a range of observable non-geographic characteristics. Poor areas are not just poor
because households with readily observable attributes which foster poverty are geographically
25concentrated. There appear to be sizable spatial differences in the retums to given household
characteristics. And there are independent spatial differences not accountable to any obvious
differences in observable household characteristics or to differences in the returns to those
characteristics. These effects could arise either from restrictions on mobility or from omitted, and
spatially correlated, heterogeneity in household characteristics. The geographic effects accord with
independent evidence on migration patterns.
Our results reinforce the case for anti-poverty programs targeted to poor areas even in an
economy with few obvious impediments to mobility. They do not, however, imply that public
investment in poor areas is the best option-there may also be scope for reducing migration costs,
such as by providing labor market information or helping with set-up costs. Nor do our results tell
us what aspects of poor areas are giving rise to poverty; is it lack of physical infrastructure, or
something else, such as poor schools, or heterogeneity in omitted household characteristics?
Further work is needed to determine what specific forms poor-area policies should take, and
whether they are cost effective relative to alternative non-geographic policies. However, our results
do suggest that there is a compelling case for further work on these issues.
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27Table 1: Regressions for log real consumption
1988-89  1991-92
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
Coeff. St Er.  Coeff. St Er.  Coeff. St. Er.  Coeff. St Er.
Constant  0.43*  0.12  0.17*  0.08  0.33*  0.12  0.19*  0.06
District
Mymensingh  -0.26*  0.05  -0.12*  0.03 -0.20*  0.04  -0.21*  0.03
Faridpur  -0.34*  0.04  -0.25*  0.03 -0.36*  0.05  -0.31*  0.03
Tangail/Jamalpur  -0.63*  0.08  -0.20*  0.04 -0.56*  0.09  -0.31*  0.03
Chittagong  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.04 -0.06*  0.03  0.13*  0.03
Comila  -0.21*  0.04  -0.11*  0.03  -0.30*  0.04 -0.04  0.03
Sylhet  0.12  0.09  0.18*  0.03  0.0  0.07  0.21*  0.03
Noakhali  -0.49*  0.06  -0.09*  0.04  -0.51*  0.09 -0.04  0.03
Khulna  -0.13*  0.03  -0.09*  0.04  -0.20*  0.03  -0.17*  0.03
Jessore  -0.17*  0.05  -0.07*  0.03  -0.23*  0.05  -0.02  0.03
Barisal/Patuakhali  -0.37*  0.04  -0.15*  0.03  -0.39*  0.05  -0.22*  0.03
Kushtia  -0.23*  0.06  -0.17*  0.04  -0.33*  0.07  -0.10*  0.04
Rajshahi  -0.17*  0.04 -0.06  0.03  -0.28*  0.04  -0.25*  0.03
Rangpur  -0.19*  0.04  -0.13*  0.03  -0.28*  0.05  -0.32*  0.03
Pabna  -0.09  0.05  -0.20*  0.03  -0.27*  0.06  -0.21*  0.03
Dinajpur  -0.32*  0.03  -0.21*  0.03  -0.33*  0.05  -0.16*  0.03
Bogra  -0.42*  0.08  -0.08*  0.04  -0.18  0.09  -0.21*  0.03
Demographics
Number of babies  -0.16*  0.03  -0.20*  0.02  -0.25*  0.02  -0.20*  0.01
Number of babies squared  0.01  0.01  0.02*  0.01  0.04*  0.01  0.03*  0.00
Number of children  -0.20*  0.02 -0.16*  0.01  -0.16*  0.02  -0.17*  0.01
Number of children squared  0.03*  0.00  0.02*  0.00  0.02*  0.00  0.02*  0.00
Number of adults  -0.15*  0.02 -0.10*  0.02  -0.10*  0.02  -0.11*  0.01
Number  of adults squared  0.01*  0.00  0.01*  0.00  0.01*  0.00  0.01*  0.00
Sex of the head  -0.06  0.07 -0.02  0.05  0.00  0.06  -0.07  0.04
No spouse, married  0.35*  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.19*  0.05  0.20*  0.03
No spouse, single  0.27*  0.05  0.09*  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.11 *  0.03
No spouse, divorced/widowed  0.01  0.06 -0.03  0.05 -0.04  0.07 -0.01  -0.04
Age of the head  0.01  0.00  0.01*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Age of the head squared  0.00  0.00  0.00*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Non Muslim  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  -0.04  0.03  -0.05*  0.02
28Education of Head
Below class 5  0.11*  0.03  0.11*  0.02  0.15*  0.03  0.07*  0.01
Class 5  0.20*  0.03  0.22*  0.02  0.16*  0.03  0.10*  0.02
Class 6 to 9  0.39*  0.04  0.24*  0.04  0.28*  0.03  0.15*  0.02
Higher level  0.56*  0.06  0.48*  0.07  0.42*  0.04  0.22*  0.03
Education of Spouse
Below  class 5  0.03  0.03  0.04*  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.05*  0.02
Class 5  0.16*  0.03  0.10*  0.04  0.09*  0.03  0.12*  0.02
Class 6 to 9  0.32*  0.05  0.06  0.10  0.15*  0.03  0.17*  0.03
Higher level  0.42*  0.10  0.52*  0.22  0.39*  0.04  0.26*  0.06
Education Differential
One levet higher  0.13*  0.03  0.10*  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.09*  0.02
Two levels higher  0.26*  0.04  0.15*  0.03  0.12*  0.04  0.14*  0.02
Three levels higher  0.31*  0.06  0.26*  0.06  0.13*  0.05  0.17*  0.03
Four/more levels higher  0.35*  0.10  0.03  0.05  0.37*  0.08  0.12*  0.04
Land Ownership
0.05 to 0.49 acres  0.09*  0.02  0.08*  0.02  0.08*  0.02  0.08*  0.02
0.50 to 1.49 acres  0.07*  0.03  0.12*  0.02  0.07*  0.03  0.17*  0.02
1.50 to 2.49 acres  0.15*  0.04  0.21*  0.03  0.09*  0.04  0.27*  0.02
2.50 acres or more  0.20*  0.03  0.38*  0.03  0.25*  0.04  0.41*  0.02
Main Occupation
Agricultural worker with land  0.12  0.08  0.09*  0.03  0.13  0.10  0.09*  0.02
Fisheries/forestry/live stock worker  0.13  0.07  0.16*  0.03  0.31*  0.10  0.18*  0.03
Tenant farmer  0.12*  0.04  0.17*  0.02  0.27*  0.07  0.18*  0.02
Owner farmer  0.22*  0.07  0.13*  0.02  0.33*  0.07  0.17*  0.02
Servant, day-laborer  0.14*  0.05  0.08*  0.03  0.16*  0.05  0.09*  0.03
Transportation, communicat. worker  0.06  0.04  0.21*  0.03  0.25*  0.05  0.19*  0.03
Salesman, service, broker, middlem.  0.14*  0.04  0.20*  0.03  0.20*  0.05  0.19*  0.03
Factory worker, artisan  0.21*  0.04  0.20*  0.03  0.30*  0.06  0.15*  0.03
Petty trader, small businessman  0.32*  0.04  0.23*  0.03  0.36*  0.05  0.25*  0.02
Executive, official, profess., teacher  0.16*  0.04  0.19*  0.04  0.29*  0.05  0.26*  0.03
Retired person, student, non working  0.11*  0.06  0.11*  0.04  0.34*  0.06  0.09*  0.03
Source:  Authors'  computations  from HES unit  level  data.  Standard  errors  corrected  for heteroscedasticity.  Number  of
observations  in 1988-89:  1856  urban  and 3770  rural. R2= 0.59 urban  and 0.41  rural.  Number  of observations  in 1991-
92: 1908  urban and  3817  rural. R 2= 0.55 urban  and  0.50 rural.  The symbol  * indicates  significance  at the 5% level  of
confidence.  The  excluded  dummies  are  the Dhaka  district,  the married  head  with  a spouse,  the male household  head,  the
Muslim  religion,  the illiterate  head,  the illiterate  spouse,  the zero  education  differential  between  other members  and the
maximum  educational  level between  the head  and  the spouse  (or the head  if he has  no spouse),  the landless  household,  and
the landless  agricultural  worker.
29Table  2: Test of equality  between  the urban  and rural regressions  (1991-92)
RSS  Number  of  F value  F test
restrictions
Unrestricted  model  626.21  - - -
Test of equality  of coefficients
All variables  662.02  57  5.63  Rejected  1 %
Constant  626.34  1  1.24  Accepted
Non-geographic  variables  642.21  40  3.58  Rejected  1 %
Household  size variables  627.57  6  2.03  Accepted
Other  demographics/religion  626.56  7  0.45  Accepted
Education  variables  632.68  12  4.83  Rejected  1 %
Land variables  629.41  4  7.18  Rejected  1 %
Occupation  variables  629.81  11  2.94  Rejected  1 %
Geographic  variables  636.94  16  6.01  Reiected  1 %
sore: Authors'  computations  from  HES unit  level  data  based  on  5725  observations  and  113  variables  in the
unrestricted  model.
Table  3: Decomposition  by sector
Urban  areas  Rural areas
1988-89  1991-92  1988-89  1991-92
Log mean consumption  0.47  0.41  0.10  0.05
Constant  0.43  0.33  0.17  0.19
Geographic  variables  -0.11  -0.14  -0.10  -0.14
Non-geographic  variables  0.15  0.22  0.02  0.00
Household  size variables  -0.64  -0.52  -0.53  -0.53
Other  demographics/religion  0.24  0.09  0.16  0.13
Education  variables  0.31  0.33  0.12  0.12
Land  variables  0.06  0.05  0.15  0.15
Occupation  variables  0.17  0.27  0.12  0.13
Source:  Authors'  computations  from  HES  unit  level  data.  Numbers  may  not  add  up  due  to rounding.
30Table 4: Consumption by district and by urban/rural areas
Consumption normalized by  Geographic profile  Concentration profile  Unconditional profile
regional poverty lines  (using 1991-92 national means)  (using 1991-92  mean parameters)
1988-89  1991-92  1988-89  1991-92  1988-89  1991-92
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
District
Dhaka  1.76  1.37  1.52  1.25  1.21  1.10  1.33  1.16  1.74  1.22  1.77  1.21
Mymensingh  1.36  1.21  1.25  1.01  1.19  1.13  1.26  1.16  1.42  1.09  1.37  0.99
Faridpur  1.26  1.07  1.06  0.91  1.14  1.07  1.17  1.15  1.15  0.93  1.03  0.88
Tangail/Jamalpur  0.94  1.12  0.87  0.92  1.13  1.07  1.29  1.15  0.78  0.97  0.94  0.88
Chittagong  1.78  1.39  1.43  1.42  1.22  1.07  1.29  1.11  1.89  1.23  1.59  1.30
Comilla  1.42  1.23  1.13  1.20  1.23  1.11  1.25  1.17  1.56  1.11  1.25  1.16
Sylhet  1.99  1.64  1.58  1.54  1.12  1.06  1.08  1.15  1.79  1.40  1.47  1.49
Noakhali  1.08  1.26  0.92  1.20  1.18  1.09  1.43  1.17  1.03  1.08  1.16  1.16
Khulna  1.54  1.26  1.25  1.05  1.26  1.12  1.39  1.21  1.57  1.14  1.49  1.06
Jessore  1.49  1.28  1.21  1.22  1.23  1.11  1.34  1.16  1.48  1.13  1.37  1.19
Barisal/Patuakhali  1.21  1.18  1.03  1.01  1.29  1.14  1.41  1.19  1.21  1.08  1.23  1.00
Kushtia  1.40  1.15  1.09  1.12  1.19  1.07  1.31  1.19  1.39  0.98  1.22  1.13
Rajshahi  1.49  1.29  1.14  0.97  1.32  1.13  1.40  1.16  1.69  1.18  1.45  0.94
Rangpur  1.46  1.20  1.15  0.91  1.23  1.10  1.28  1.11  1.51  1.07  1.28  0.84
Pabna  1.61  1.12  1.16  1.01  1.17  1.02  1.30  1.08  1.61  0.93  1.31  0.91
Dinajpur  1.28  1.11  1.09  1.07  1.23  1.13  1.25  1.11  1.24  1.03  1.15  0.99
Bogra  1.16  1.27  1.26  1.01  1.02  1.08  1.07  1.17  1.48  1.11  1.12  0.99
Source:  Authors'  computations  from  HES unit  level  data. A value  of I indicates  that  consumption  is at the poverty  line for that  district.
31Table  5: Headcount  index of poverty by district  and  by urban/rural  areas
Percentage of households  Geographic profile  Concentration profile  Unconditional profile
below the poverty line  (using 1991-92 national means)  (using 1991-92 mean parameters)
1988-89  1991-92  1988-89  1991-92  1988-89  1991-92
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
District
Dhaka  6.01  18.92  12.50  24.23  44.33  54.57  34.73  48.44  15.86  33.82  13.47  39.48
Mymensingh  19.78  29.39  27.13  48.58  45.88  52.32  40.26  48.66  30.00  43.04  32.89  52.19
Faridpur  26.41  42.73  43.60  61.03  50.80  57.65  48.56  49.88  41.27  62.21  51.56  64.25
Tangail/Jamalpur  56.60  37.19  65.11  60.41  51.84  57.55  37.35  49.75  75.00  55.56  50.00  58.58
Chittagong  5.67  17.87  16.16  13.61  43.39  57.65  38.03  55.02  9.67  27.75  16.97  20.00
Comilla  16.60  28.19  36.77  28.31  42.38  53.62  40.56  48.04  26.32  38.26  37.50  34.80
Sylhet  2.96  8.29  10.46  8.85  52.94  58.78  57.09  49.57  10.71  20.60  12.50  10.78
Noakhali  41.91  26.25  59.39  28.70  47.17  56.35  27.78  47.80  25.00  51.14  37.50  37.36
Khulna  11.62  26.17  27.09  43.41  40.28  53.10  30.41  43.87  23.95  41.95  27.08  48.57
Jessore  13.57  24.48  30.10  26.37  42.72  53.75  33.91  48.71  23.44  38.22  21.88  35.79
Barisal/Patuakhali  30.01  32.41  47.29  49.23  37.32  51.33  28.68  45.73  29.03  48.76  40.63  52.49
Kushtia  17.62  34.44  40.27  35.62  46.52  57.84  36.06  45.63  26.09  57.45  34.38  38.54
Rajshahi  13.69  23.93  35.59  53.53  35.53  52.37  29.30  49.25  14.10  40.30  18.75  55.35
Rangpur  15.00  30.55  34.83  62.00  42.48  54.95  38.52  54.63  15.87  46.39  28.13  65.30
Pabna  9.63  37.28  34.18  48.22  48.22  62.91  36.77  58.19  12.50  54.69  27.91  62.50
Dinajpur  25.11  38.28  40.84  41.97  42.49  51.60  41.40  54.02  32.81  46.86  37.10  55.11
Bogra  34.50  25.16  25.99  48.42  62.62  56.71  58.14  48.21  62.50  41.13  37.50  51.75
Source:  Authors'  computations  from  HES  unit  level  data.  A headcount  of 6.01  indicates  that  6.01%  of households  are  poor in that district.
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